I consider the question of which dependencies are safe for a Team Semantics-based logic FO(D), in the sense that they do not increase its expressive power over sentences when added to it. I show that some dependencies, like totality, non-constancy and non-emptiness, are safe for all logics FO(D), and that other dependencies, like constancy, are not safe for FO(D) for some choices of D despite being strongly first order (that is, safe for FO( / 0)). I furthermore show that the possibility operator ⋄φ , which holds in a team if and only if φ holds in some nonempty subteam, can be added to any logic FO(D) without increasing its expressive power over sentences.
Introduction
Team Semantics [16] generalizes Tarskian Semantics for First Order Logic by allowing formulas to be satisfied or not satisfied with respect to sets of assignments (called teams), rather than with respect to single assignments. First Order Logic with Team Semantics is easily shown to be equivalent to First Order Logic with Tarskian Semantics, in the sense that a first order formula is satisfied by a set of assignments in Team Semantics if and only if it is satisfied by all assignments in the set with respect to Tarskian Semantics.
The richer nature of the satisfaction relation of Team Semantics, however, makes it possible to extend First Order Logic in novel ways, such as by introducing new operators or quantifiers [1, 4, 6, 23] or new types of atomic formulas which specify dependencies between different assignments contained in a team. Examples of important logics obtained in the latter way are Dependence Logic [22] , Inclusion Logic [5] , and Independence Logic [11] . Despite the semantics of the atoms which these logics add to the language of First Order Logic being first order (when understood as conditions over the relations corresponding to teams), these logics are strictly more expressive than First Order Logic. This, in brief, is due to the second order existential quantifications implicit in the Team Semantics rules for disjunction and existential quantification. Thus, exploring the properties of fragments of such logics (as done for instance in [2, 3, 10, 12, 21] ) provides an interesting avenue to the study of the properties and relations between fragments of Second Order Logic.
This work is a contribution towards the more systematic study of the properties of first order definable dependency atoms and of the logics they generate. Building on the work of [7, 9] , which dealt with the case of dependencies which are strongly first order in that they do not increase the expressive power of First Order Logic if added to it, we will find some preliminary answers to the following Question: Let D = {D 1 , D 2 , . . .} be a set of first order definable dependencies. Can we characterize the sets of dependencies E = {E 1 , E 2 , . . .} which are safe for D, in the sense that every sentence of
FO(D, E ) is equivalent to some sentence of FO(D)?
To the author's knowledge, this notion of safety -which is the natural generalization of the notion of strongly first order dependency of [7, 9] -has not been considered so far in the literature; and, as we will see, known results and currently open problems regarding the expressive power of logics with Team Semantics can be reframed in terms of it, and information concerning the safety of dependencies (or operators, if we generalize the notion of dependency to operators in the obvious way) can be highly useful to prove relationships between logics with Team Semantics. However, as we will also see, safety is a delicate notion: in particular, dependencies which are strongly first order (that is, safe for the empty set of dependencies) are not necessarily safe for all sets of dependencies.
These results will show that this notion of safety is a subtle one, deserving of further investigation. Additionally, by means of these answers we will see that the possibility operator ⋄φ , which holds in a team if φ holds in some nonempty subteam of it, can be added to any logic FO(D) without increasing its expressive power.
Preliminaries

Team Semantics
In this section we will briefly recall the notation used in this work, the definition of Team Semantics, and some basic results that will be used in the rest of this work. Through all of this work, we will always assume that all our (first order) models M have at least two elements in their domain M and that we have countable sets of variable symbols {x i , y i , z i , w i , . . . : i ∈ N} and of relation symbols R, S, . . . of all arities. We will write x, y, v and so on to describe tuples of variable symbols; and likewise, we will write m, a, b and so forth to describe tuples of elements of a model. For any tuple a of elements, |a| will represent the length of a; and likewise, |v| represents the length of the tuple of variables v. Given any set A, we will furthermore write P(A) for the powerset {B : B ⊆ A} of A.
Variable assignments and substitutions are defined in the usual way: 
For any function f : M → M and any assignment s over M, we will write f(s) for the unique assignment with the same domain of s such that f(s)(v) = f(s(v)) for all v ∈ Dom(s).
Given an expression φ , we will write FV(φ ) for the set of all variables occurring free (that is, not in the scope of a quantifier for them) in φ ; and given a tuple t of terms of our language, we will write var(t) for the set of all variables occurring in t.
Let 
In other words, a supplementation function H for the team X selects, for each assignment s ∈ X , a nonempty set H(X ) of possible values for the variables v, and X [H/v] is obtained from X by assigning these possible values to the variables v.
The duplication operator, which will be now described, corresponds then to the special case of supplementation for which H(s) = M k for all s ∈ X : 
Team Semantics was originally developed by Hodges in [16] in order to provide a compositional semantics equivalent to the imperfect-information, game-theoretic semantics of Independence-Friendly Logic [13, 14, 15] ; but for our purposes it will be useful to first present it for First Order Logic proper. For simplicity, we will assume that all expressions are in Negation Normal Form: 
The [R : t] operator, dependencies, and a normal form
As we saw in the previous section, there is a very strict connection between Tarskian Semantics and Team Semantics for First Order Logic: not only these two semantics agree with respect to the truth of sentences, but the satisfaction conditions of a first order formula φ with respect to Team Semantics can be obtained in a very straightforward way from the satisfaction conditions of the same formula with respect to Tarskian Semantics.
There is, however, an important asymmetry in First Order Logic between Tarskian Semantics and Team Semantics. Every first order definable property of tuples of elements corresponds trivially to the satisfaction condition (in Tarskian Semantics) of some first order formula. However, not all first order definable properties of teams (interpreted as relations) correspond to the satisfaction conditions (in Team Semantics) of first order formulas, as the following easy consequence of Proposition 7 shows:
Corollary 9 There is no first order formula φ (v), with v as its only free variable, such that for all first order models M and teams X with v
∈ Dom(X ) it holds that M |= X φ (v) if and only if |X (v)| = |{s(v) : s ∈ X }| ≥ 2 (
that is, if and only if the variable v takes at least two distinct values in X ).
Thus, the property of unary relations describable as "containing at least two elements", which is easily seen to be first order definable via the sentence Φ(U ) = ∃pq(U p ∧U q ∧ p = q), does not correspond to the satisfaction conditions (according to Team Semantics) of any first order formula.
A straightforward way to ensure that all first order definable properties of relations correspond to the satisfaction conditions of formulas would be to add the following rule to our semantics:
TS-[:]:
For all signatures Σ, all models M having signature Σ, all k ∈ N, all k-ary relation symbols R (which may or may not occur already in Σ), all tuples t = t 1 . . .t k of terms, and all first order formulas φ in the signature Σ ∪ {R}, Three of these four properties are preserved by the connectives of our language, as it can be proved by straightforward induction:
} be a family of dependencies which are all Downwards Closed [are all Union Closed, have all the Empty Team Property]. Then every formula of FO(D) is Downwards Closed [is Union Closed, has the Empty Team Property].
The property of union closure, on the other hand, is clearly not preserved in the same way as it is violated already by first order literals. However, this property is nonetheless useful for the classification of the expressive power of logics with Team Semantics. 
It follows from the above equivalences that all logics FO(D), for all choices of D, admit the following Prenex Normal Form, which is analogous of the one proved in Theorem 15 of [10] : In general, in Team Semantics θ ֒→ φ is not logically equivalent to the typical interpretation ¬θ ∨ φ of the implication θ → φ . 4 In [7, 9] the same operator was written as φ ↾ θ ; here, however, we prefer to use the ֒→ notation as in the first occurrence of an operator of this type in the literature 5 [18] and as in recent literature in the area of Team Semantics (e.g. [20] ), in order to emphasize the "implication-like" qualities of this connective. As long as we are working with models with at least two elements it is possible to use the ֒→ operator to get rid of the second order quantification implicit in the Team Semantics rule for disjunctions, at the cost of adding further existential quantifiers: 
•
• If the variable y does not occur in θ then θ ֒→ (∃yψ) ≡ ∃y(θ ֒→ ψ);
• If the variable y does not occur in θ then θ ֒→ (∀yψ) ≡ ∀y(θ ֒→ ψ).
Using the above results it is possible to prove the existence of the following normal form: 
where the θ k and ψ are quantifier-free and contain no dependency atoms, and where furthermore each possible instance D i t of every dependence atom D i ∈ D appears the same number of times in φ and in φ ′ and there are as many universal quantifiers in φ ′ as in φ Proof: First, let us rename variables so that no variable is bound in two different places in φ and no variable occurs both bound and free in φ . 6 Then let us bring φ in prenex normal form Q 1 v 1 . . . Q n v n ψ for ψ quantifier free, as per Theorem 17.
Then let us get rid of disjunctions by Lemma 21, replacing each subformula ψ 1 ∨ ψ 2 with ∃q 1 q 2 (q 1 = q 2 ֒→ ψ 1 ) ∧ (q 1 = q 2 ֒→ ψ 2 ) for two new variables q 1 and q 2 (different for each disjunction). Then let us bring the newly introduced existential quantifiers outside of subexpressions too, using the transformations of Proposition 16 and Lemma 22 as required. Finally, again using the transformations of Lemma 22, let us bring conjunctions outside the consequents of ֒→ operators and merge multiple occurrences of ֒→ of the form θ 1 ֒→ (θ 2 ֒→ ψ) as (θ 1 ∧ θ 2 ) ֒→ ψ.
The final result will be an expression of the form
, where all α j are either occurrences Dt of dependency atoms D ∈ D or first order literals α and where the θ j are quantifier-free conjunctions of first order literals with variables in y. This is easily seen to be the same as the required form, where we combined all θ j ֒→ α j for first order α j into ψ. It is clear furthermore that no additional universal quantifiers or dependency atoms are introduced by this transformation.
Strongly First Order Dependencies
Because of the higher order quantification hidden in the Team Semantics rules for disjunction and existential quantification, even comparatively simple first order dependencies such inclusion atoms [5] A dependency, or set of dependencies, is said to be strongly first order if this is not the case:
} be a set of dependencies. We say that D is strongly first order if and only if every sentence of FO(D) is logically equivalent to some sentence of First Order Logic FO.
It is important to emphasize here that the above definition asks merely that every sentence of FO(D) is equivalent to some sentence of FO. As we saw in Corollary 9, not all first order properties of teams correspond to the satisfaction conditions of first order formulas in Team Semantics; but nonetheless, some of those properties may be added as dependencies to First Order Logic without increasing the expressive power of its sentences. We can ask then the following Question: Are there non-trivial choices of D which are strongly first order? This is a question of some importance not only because of its relevance to the classification of extensions of First Order Logic via Team Semantics but also because knowing which families of dependencies do not make the resulting logics computationally untreatable is essential for studying applications of Team Semantics in e.g. Database Theory (see for example [17] ).
A positive answer to the above question was found in [7] , in which the following result was found:
Theorem 25 Let D ↑ be the family of all upwards closed dependencies 7 and let =(·) be the family of all constancy dependencies =(·) := ∀xy(Rx ∧ Ry → x = y) of all arities. 8 Then D ↑ ∪ =(·) is strongly first order.
In [9] it was furthermore shown that all unary first-order dependencies are definable in FO(D ↑ , =(·)), 9 and hence do not increase the expressive power of First Order Logic if added to it. It is still unknown, however, whether the above result is a characterization of all strongly first order families of dependencies. In other words, the following problem is still open:
Open Conjecture: Let D be a strongly first order family of dependencies. Then every D ∈ D is definable in FO(=(·), D ↑ ).
Safe Dependencies
By definition, a class D of dependencies is strongly first order if and only if FO(D) is no more expressive than FO over sentences. In many cases, this is perhaps too restrictive a notion: indeed, it may be that instead we have already a family D of dependencies whose expressive power is suitable for our needs (for instance, as in the case of inclusion dependencies, that captures the PTIME complexity class over finite ordered structures) and we may be interested in characterizing the families E that do not further increase it if added to the language. This justifies the following, more general notion:
set of dependencies. Another set of dependencies E is safe for D if any sentence of FO(E , D) is equivalent to some sentence of FO(D).
7 That is, as per Definition 12, all D(R) ∈ D must be such that
8 It is straightforward, however, to see that constancy dependencies of arity one suffice to define the others: for instance, =(xy) ≡=(x)∧ =(y). 9 In this work we will commit a minor notational abuse here and write FO(D ↑ , =(·)) instead of FO(D ↑ ∪ =(·)) and so forth.
It is obvious that strongly first orderness is a special case of safety: Are all dependencies (or families of dependencies) which are safe for some D definable in it? In general, this cannot be true: as we saw in Corollary 9, non-constancy dependencies
are not definable in FO = FO( / 0), but since they are upwards closed we know by Theorem 25 that they are strongly first order (and, therefore, safe for / 0). Or, to mention another example, all families of dependence atoms are safe for the functional dependence atoms of Dependence Logic: indeed, Dependence Logic is equivalent to full Existential Second Order Logic Σ 1 1 on the level of sentences [22] , and it is straightforward to see that FO(D) is contained in Σ 1 1 for all choices of D. However, for instance, the above-mentioned non-constancy atoms are certainly not definable in Dependence Logic because of Proposition 13, since functional dependencies are downwards closed while they are not.
Classes of dependencies for which safety and definability coincide may be called closed:
Definition 29 (Closed Classes of Dependencies) Let D be a class of dependencies. Then D is closed if and only if every E which is safe for D contains only dependencies which are definable in FO(D).
A class D of dependencies, in other words, is closed if all dependencies that may be added to FO(D) without increasing its expressive power are already expressible in terms of FO(D). The class of all first order dependencies is trivially closed; and, for instance, it follows easily from known results [5] that, since all those dependencies are definable in terms of independence atoms [11] y⊥ x z := [R : xyz]∀uv 1 w 1 v 2 w 2 (Ruv 1 w 1 ∧ Ruv 2 w 2 → Ruv 1 w 2 ) and nonemptiness atoms NE(x) := [V : x]∃uVu, any family containing these two types of dependencies is closed. On the other hand, the family D ↓ of all downwards closed dependencies is not closed in the sense of the above definition, since inclusion atoms and independence atoms are safe for it despite not being downwards closed (and, therefore, not being definable in terms of downwards closed atoms).
The problem of characterizing other, weaker closed classes of dependencies is entirely open, and a complete solution of it would go a long way in providing a classification of the extensions of first order logic via first order dependencies. In particular, the conjecture mentioned in Section 2.3 has the following, equivalent formulation:
Open Conjecture (equivalent formulation): Let D ↑ be the class of all upwards closed dependencies and let =(·) be the class of all constancy dependencies. Then D ↑ ∪ =(·) is closed.
Answering this conjecture, and more in general characterizing the closed families of dependencies, is left to future work. In the rest of this work, a few preliminary results will be presented that provide some information about the properties of the notion of safety.
The Safety of Totality, Inconstancy, Nonemptiness and Possibility
A natural question to consider to begin exploring the properties of safety is the following: are there dependencies which are safe for all families of dependencies D? As we will see, the answer is positive, as shown by the totality atoms All(x) = [R : x]∀vRv.
Lemma 30 Let φ be a FO(All, D) sentence of the form ∀x 1 ∃y 1 . . . ∀x n ∃y n ((θ (y n ) ֒→ All(t))∧ χ(x, y)), where θ is first order and t is a tuple of terms with variables in xy = x 1 . . . x n y 1 . . . y n .
Then φ is logically equivalent to the expression 
Proof:
By Theorem 23, we can assume that φ ∈ FO(All, D) is of the form
where NE does not occur in ψ. Then we get rid of the totality atoms one at a time, using the above lemma and renormalizing. As the normalization procedure of Theorem 23 does not introduce further dependency atoms, the procedure will eventually terminate in a sentence without totality atoms. Thus, φ is equivalent to some sentence φ ′ ∈ FO(D).
From the safety of totality it follows at once that all dependencies that are definable in FO(All) are also safe. For instance: 
Observe that NC(v) ≡ ∀w(w = v ֒→ All(w)) and that NE(v) ≡ (v = v) ∧ ∀wAll(w). 10 Furthermore, additional operators can be shown to be definable in terms of totality (and, hence, not to add to the expressive power of any logic FO(D). For instance, consider the following connective: 
Observe that ⋄ψ is logically equivalent to (NE ∧ ψ) ∨ ⊤. Therefore, every sentence of FO(D, ⋄) is equivalent to some sentence of FO(D, NE); but by Corollary 32 this is equivalent to some sentence in FO(D, All), and by Theorem 31, every such sentence is equivalent to some sentence of FO(D) as required.
Results like these ones contribute to the study of Team Semantics not only in the sense that they provide information regarding e.g. the properties of totality, inconstancy and nonemptiness atoms or possibility operators in this context, but also and more importantly because they allow us to use such atoms and operators freely as tools for investigating the expressive power of any other logic FO(D). 
Then every sentence of FO(⊆ k ) is equivalent to some sentence of FO(| k ).
Proof:
Observe that x ⊆ y is logically equivalent to ∃zw(x|z ∧ (w = y ∨ w = z) ∧ All(w))). 11 Thus every sentence of FO(⊆ k ) is equivalent to some sentence of FO(| k , All), which -by the safety of totality -is equivalent to some sentence of FO(| k ).
This fact could have also been extracted from a careful analysis of known -and delicate -equivalences between these logics and fragments of Σ 1 1 . 12 However, the advantage of this approach is that we could obtain our result directly, without having to rely on characterizations of these fragments in terms of Σ 1 1 (which were available for these specific, well-studied logics, but may not be so for other FO(D).).
The Unsafety of Constancy
As we saw in the previous section, three typical strongly first order dependencies -that is, totality, nonconstancy and nonemptiness -are safe for all families of dependencies. A reasonable hypothesis to make at this point would be that the same is true of all strongly first order dependencies. This is
The undirected graphs A n and B n . There is no unary inclusion logic sentences which is true for all A n and is false for all B n , and therefore non-connectedness is not definable in unary inclusion logic. Note that there exist automorphisms sending any element (red) to any other element of the model, no matter if in the same connected component (green) or in different components (blue).
not however the case, as constancy atoms are strongly first order but are not safe for all families of dependencies. Indeed, as we will see, graph non-connectedness is definable in terms of constancy and unary inclusion atoms, but not in terms of unary inclusion atoms alone. In keeping with the existing literature on the subject, we will use =(x) for the atom expressing that x takes a constant value in the team (that is, for [U : x]∀vw(U v∧U w → v = w)) and x ⊆ y for the atom expressing that all possible values of x are also possible values for y (that is,
). We will use the symbols =(·) and ⊆ 1 for representing these two types of dependencies. Then it is straightforward to see that (as mentioned already in [5] ) non-connectedness is definable in FO(=(·), ⊆ 1 ):
is true in a model G = (G, E) if and only if it is not connected.
However, as we will now show, unary inclusion atoms alone do not suffice to define non-connectedness. In particular, for any n ∈ N, let the graphs A n and B n be constituted respectively by two cycles of length 2 n+1 and by a single cycle of length 2 n+2 , as shown in Figure 1 . Then, as we will now see, it is not possible to find a FO(⊆ 1 ) sentence that is true in all A n and false in all B n . This can be proved by means of an Ehrenfeucht-Fraïssé game defined along the lines of the one for Dependence Logic of [22] ; but in what follows, a different -and simpler -proof will be shown. A n and B n ) Let G = (G, E) be an undirected graph of the form A n or of the form B n for some n ∈ N, and let p, q ∈ G be two nodes of this graph. Then there exists an automorphism f : 
Lemma 37 (Automorphisms in
The next lemma is less obvious, and shows that over models such as the A n and B n and for teams closed under automorphisms FO(⊆ 1 ) is no more expressive than first order logic:
Lemma 43 Let M be a model such that for any two points m 1 , m 2 ∈ M there exists an automorphism
Then for all teams X over M such that X = Cl(X ) and all formulas φ ∈ FO(⊆ 1 ) with free variables in Dom(X ) we have that M |= X φ ⇔ M |= X φ f .
Proof:
The left to right direction is already taken care of by Lemma 39. The right to left direction is proved via structural induction and presents no particular difficulties. We show in detail the case of inclusion atoms, which is helpful for understanding why FO(⊆ 1 ) is no more expressive than FO over these types of models.
As (v 1 ⊆ v 2 ) f = ⊤, we need to prove that M |= X v 1 ⊆ v 2 whenever X is a team whose domain contains the variables v 1 and v 2 and X = Cl(X ). But this is the case. Indeed, suppose that s(v 1 ) = m 1 and s(v 2 ) = m 2 . Then by assumption, there is an automorphism f of M such that f(m 2 ) = m 1 , and since X = Cl(X ) there exists some assignment s ′ ∈ X such that s ′ (v) = f(s(v)) for all v ∈ Dom(s). This implies in particular that s ′ (v 2 ) = f(s(v 2 )) = f(m 2 ) = m 1 = s(v 1 ); and thus, for any assignment s ∈ X there exists some assignment s ′ ∈ Cl(X ) = X such that s ′ (v 2 ) = s(v 1 ). This shows that M |= X v 1 ⊆ v 2 , as required.
Given the above lemma, the following consequence is immediate:
Proposition 44 Let G = (G, E) be a graph of the form A n or of the form B n , and let φ be a FO(⊆ 1 ) sentence over its signature. Then G |= φ if and only if G |= φ f .
By definition, G |= φ if and only if G |= {ε} φ , where ε is the unique empty assignment. But {ε} is closed by automorphisms, and therefore G |= φ if and only if G |= φ f . However, it can be shown via a standard back-and-forth argument that there is no first order sentence φ f that is true in all models of the form A n and is false in all models of the form B n . As a direct consequence of this, of Proposition 36 and of Proposition 44 we then have that there exist FO(=(·), ⊆ 1 ) sentences that are not equivalent to any FO(⊆ 1 ) sentence, that is that Theorem 45 Constancy atoms =(·) are not safe for FO(⊆ 1 ).
Conclusions
In this work, the concept of safe dependencies has been introduced. This notion generalizes the previously considered notion of strongly first order dependencies, and -aside from being of independent interest -it is a useful tool for the study of the expressivity (over sentences) of logics based on Team Semantics: indeed, being able to fully characterize the dependencies which are safe for a given logic is the same as fully characterizing the ways in which the language of this logic can be expanded (via dependency atoms) without increasing its overall expressive power.
A natural point from which to begin the exploration of this notion was to examine the relationship between this notion and the notion of strongly first order dependency itself; and, as we saw, the obvious conjecture according to which a strongly first order dependency must be safe for all families of dependencies does not hold. This shows that the notion of safety is a delicate one -one that, in particular, is not preserved when additional dependencies are added to the language. 13 The problem of characterizing safe dependencies and closed dependency families is almost entirely open, and steps towards its solution would do much to clarify the properties of logics based on Team Semantics.
We focused exclusively on logics obtained by adding new dependency atoms to the language of First Order Logic (interpreted via Team Semantics). The problems considered here, however, could also be studied as part of a more general theory of operators in Team Semantics, for a sufficiently powerful notion of "operator" (possibly based on generalized quantifiers and/or on ideas from Transition Semantics [8] ). In this wider context, it seems likely that the questions and open conjectures discussed here would be of even harder solution; but on the other hand, it is possible that the study of the expressive power of families of operators (as opposed to dependencies) in Team Semantics would provide useful insights also towards the solution of the questions discussed in this work.
